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1 Introduction.
Optimal timing (or \stopping") problems are an important class of stochastic control prob-
lems that arise in economics and ¯nance, as well as other ¯elds. Unlike \continuous control"
problems, in which one or more control variables are adjusted continuously and optimally
over time to maximize some objective function, these problems involve the optimal timing
of a discrete action.1 Important examples include optimal exercise rules for ¯nancial options
(e.g., ¯nding the threshold price of a dividend-paying stock at which it is optimal to exercise
a call option on that stock), and optimal capital investment and disinvestment decisions
(e.g., ¯nding the threshold prices of copper at which it is optimal to shut down an existing
copper mine or invest in a new mine).2
As illustrated by a small but growing literature, optimal timing problems of this sort
also arise in environmental economics. These problems are of the following basic form: At
what point should society adopt a (costly) policy to reduce emissions of some environmental
pollutant? The traditional approach to this problem applies standard cost-bene¯t analysis
(a simple NPV rule in capital budgeting terms), and would thus recommend adopting a
policy if the present value of the expected °ow of bene¯ts exceeds the present value of the
expected °ow of costs. This standard approach, however, ignores three important charac-
teristics of most environmental problems. First, there is almost always uncertainty over the
future costs and bene¯ts of adopting a particular policy. With global warming, for example,
we do not know how much average temperatures will rise with or without reduced emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHG) such as CO2, nor do we know the economic impact of higher
temperatures. Second, there are usually important irreversibilities associated with environ-
mental policy. These irreversibilities can arise with respect to environmental damage itself,
but also with respect to the costs of adopting policies to reduce the damage. Third, policy
1Kendrick (1981) provides a textbook treatment of what I have termed \continuous control" problems. He
gives particular attention to stochastic adaptive control problems (in which optimal feedback rules are found
for the response of control variables to stochastic shocks in the state variables), as well as \dual control"
problems (in which control variables are adjusted to obtain information as well as directly the trajectories
of the state variables.)
2For a textbook treatment of such optimal capital investment decisions, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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adoption is rarely a now or never proposition; in most cases it is feasible to delay action and
wait for new information. These uncertainties, irreversibilities, and the possibility of delay
can signi¯cantly a®ect the optimal timing of policy adoption.
There are two kinds of irreversibilities, and they work in opposite directions. First,
an environmental policy imposes sunk costs on society. For example, coal-burning utilities
might be forced to install scrubbers or pay more for low-sulphur coal, or ¯rms might have
to scrap existing machines and invest in more fuel-e±cient ones. Such sunk costs create an
opportunity cost of adopting a policy now, rather than waiting for more information, and this
biases traditional cost-bene¯t analysis in favor of policy adoption. Second, environmental
damage can be partially or totally irreversible. For example, increases in GHG concentrations
are long lasting, and the damage to ecosystems from higher global temperatures (or from
acidi¯ed lakes and streams, or the clear-cutting of forests) can be permanent. Thus adopting
a policy now rather than waiting has a sunk bene¯t, i.e., a negative opportunity cost, which
biases traditional cost-bene¯t analysis against policy adoption.3
There are also two types of uncertainty that are relevant. The ¯rst is economic uncer-
tainty, i.e., uncertainty over the future costs and bene¯ts of environmental damage and its
reduction. In the case of global warming, even if we knew how large a temperature increase
to expect, we would not know the resulting cost to society | we cannot predict how a tem-
perature increase would a®ect agricultural output, land use, etc. The second is ecological
uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the evolution of the relevant ecosystems. For example,
even if we knew that we could meet a speci¯ed policy target for GHG emissions over the
next forty years, we would not know the resulting levels of atmospheric GHG concentrations
and average global equilibrium temperature increase.4
A number of recent studies have begun to examine the implications of irreversibility
3This point was made some two decades ago by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), and Krutilla and
Fisher (1975).
4For a forecasting model of CO2 emissions with an explicit treatment of forecast uncertainty, see
Schmalensee, Stoker, and Judd (1998). For general discussions of the uncertainties inherent in the analysis of
global warming, see Cline (1992) and Solow (1991). Similar uncertainties exist with respect to acid rain. For
example, we are unable to accurately predict how particular levels of NOX emissions will a®ect the future
acidity of lakes and rivers, or the viability of the ¯sh populations that live in them.
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and uncertainty for environmental policy, at times drawing upon the theory of irreversible
investment decisions. I will not attempt to survey this literature here.5 Instead, I will
examine the optimal timing of environmental policy in two ways.
First, I lay out a simple two-period model, in which the choice is whether to adopt
an emissions-reducing policy now, or wait some ¯xed period of time (e.g., 20 years), and
then, depending on new information that has arrived regarding the extent of environmental
degradation and its economic cost, either adopt the policy or reject it. Although this models
is very restrictive, it brings out many of the key insights.6
Second, I extend and generalize the continuous-time model of environmental policy adop-
tion in Pindyck (2000). In that model, an emissions-reducing policy can be adopted at any
time. Information arrives continually, but there is always uncertainty over the future evolu-
tion of key environmental variables, and over the future costs and bene¯ts of policy adoption.
As in this paper, I focused on how irreversibilities and uncertainty interact in a®ecting the
timing of policy adoption. However, in that earlier work, I included only one form of uncer-
tainty at a time | economic or ecological | but not both together. Here I generalize the
model to include both forms of uncertainty at the same time. This provides additional insight
into their individual e®ects on policy adoption, as well as the e®ects of their interactions.
In the next section, I lay out the basic two-period model of policy adoption. Although it
is quite simple, the model illustrates how and why uncertainty a®ects the timing and design
of an emissions-reducing policy. In Section 3, I present the continuous-time model and
show how it can be solved. By calculating solutions for di®erent combinations of parameter
values, I show how economic and ecological uncertainties a®ect the optimal timing of policy
adoption. Section 4 concludes.
5Examples of this literature include Conrad (1992), Hendricks (1992), Kelly and Kolstad (1999), Kolstad
(1996), Narain and Fisher (1998), and Pindyck (1996, 2000).
6Hammitt, Lempert, and Schlesinger (1992) use a two-period model to study implications of uncertainty
for adoption of policies to reduce GHG emissions, and show that under some conditions it may be desirable
to wait for additional information.
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2 A Two-Period Model.
In a traditional cost-bene¯t analysis of environmental policy, the problem typically boils
down to whether or not a particular policy should be adopted. When irreversibilities are
involved, the more appropriate question is when (if ever) it should be adopted. In other
words, adopting a policy today competes not only with never adopting the policy, but also
with adopting it next year, in two years, and so on. Thus the policy problem is one of
optimal stopping.
As in Pindyck (1996, 2000), I will work with a bare-bones model that captures the
basic stock externality associated with many environmental problems in as simple a way as
possible, while still allowing us to capture key sources of uncertainty. Let Mt be a state
variable that summarizes one or more stocks of environmental pollutants, e.g., the average
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere or the acidity level of a lake. Let Et be a °ow
variable that controls Mt. For example, Et might be the rate of CO2 or SO2 emissions.
We will assume that absent some policy intervention, Et follows an exogenous trajectory.
Ignoring uncertainty for the time being, the evolution of Mt is then given by:
dM=dt = ¯E(t)¡ ±M(t) ; (1)
where ± is the natural rate at which the stock of pollutant dissipates over time.
I will assume that the °ow of social cost (i.e., negative bene¯t) associated with the stock
variable Mt can be speci¯ed by a function B(Mt; µt), where µt shifts stochastically over time
re°ecting changes in tastes and technologies. For example, if M is the GHG concentration,
shifts in µ might re°ect the arrival of new agricultural techniques that reduce the social cost
of a higher M , or demographic changes that raise the cost. One would generally expect
B(Mt; µt) to be convex in Mt, but for simplicity I will assume in this section that B is linear
in M :
B(Mt; µt) = ¡µtMt : (2)
I also begin with a restrictive assumption about the evolution of Et: Until a policy is adopted,
Et stays at the constant initial level E0, and policy adoption implies a once-and-for-all
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reduction to a new and permanent level E1, with 0 ∙ E1 ∙ E0. Finally, I assume that the
social cost of adopting this policy is completely sunk, and its present value at the time of
adoption, which I denote by K(E1), is a function of the size of the emission reduction.
The policy objective is to maximize the net present value function:
W = E0
Z 1
0
B(Mt; µt)e
¡rt dt ¡ E0K(E1)e¡r ~T ; (3)
subject to eqn. (1). Here, ~T is the (in general, unknown) time that the policy is adopted,
E0¡E1 is the amount that emissions are reduced, E0 denotes the expectation at time t = 0,
and r is the discount rate.
In this section, I make T a ¯xed time in the future. Thus the choices are to adopt the
policy today (making MT smaller than it would be otherwise), or to wait until time T and
then, after evaluating the situation, decide whether or not to adopt the policy. I will also
assume initially that if the policy is adopted, emissions are reduced from E0 to zero. Hence
the sunk cost of policy adoption is simply a number, K. (Later in this section I will consider
the possibility of reducing E to some level E1 > 0, and I will also examine the adoption
decision when the policy is partially reversible.)
For this problem to be interesting, we need to introduce some source of uncertainty. I
will assume that there is economic uncertainty but not ecological uncertainty, i.e., there is
uncertainty over the evolution of µt but not over the evolution of Mt. To keep matters as
simple as possible, I will assume that µT will equal µ or µ with equal probability, with µ < µ
and 1
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(µ + µ) = µ0, the current value of µ. I will also assume that µ does not change after
time T . Finally, I will consider the following decision rule that applies if we wait until time
T : Adopt the policy if and only if µT = µ. (I will choose parameter values so that this is
indeed the optimal policy, given that we have waited until time T to make a decision.)
By solving eqn. (1), we can determine Mt as a function of time. Suppose the policy is
adopted at time T , so that Et = E0 for t < T and Et = 0 for t ¸ T . Then:
Mt =
8<: (¯E0=±)(1¡ e
¡±t) +M0e¡±t for 0 ∙ t ∙ T
(¯E0=±)(e
±T ¡ 1)e¡±t +M0e¡±t for t > T
(4)
where M0 is the initial value of Mt. If the policy is never adopted, the ¯rst line of eqn. (4)
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applies for all t, so that Mt asymptotically approaches ¯E0=±. If the policy is adopted at
time 0, then Mt =M0e
¡±t.
First, suppose that the policy is never adopted. Then, denoting the value function in
this case by WN :
WN = ¡
Z 1
0
µ0Mte
¡rt dt
= ¡µ0
Z 1
0
h
(¯E0=±)(1¡ e¡±t) +M0e¡±t
i
e¡rt dt
= ¡ µ0M0
(r + ±)
¡ ¯E0µ0
r(r + ±)
(5)
Next, suppose the policy is adopted at time t = 0. Then a sunk cost K is incurred immedi-
ately, Et = 0 always, and the value function is:
W0 = ¡µ0M0
r + ±
¡K : (6)
A conventional cost-bene¯t analysis would recommend adoption of the policy if the net
present value W0 ¡WN is positive, i.e., if ¯E0µ0=r(r + ±)¡K > 0.
Let us introduce some numbers so that we can compare these two alternatives: the
present value of the cost to society of policy adoption, K, is $2 billion, r = :04, ± = :02, ¯ =
1 (i.e., all emissions are completely absorbed into the ecosystem), E0 = 300,000 tons/year,
and µ0 = $20/ton/year.
7 In what follows, I will also assume that µ = $10/ton/year, and µ
= $30/ton/year. These parameter values are summarized in Table 1.
Given these numbers, ¯E0µ0=r(r + ±) = $2.5 billion. Since the conventionally measured
NPV of policy adoption is W0 ¡WN = ¯E0µ0=r(r + ±)¡K = $0.5 billion, it would appear
desirable to adopt the policy now.
Suppose that instead we wait until time T and then adopt the policy only if µT = µ.
Denoting the value function that corresponds to this course of action byWT , using eqn. (4),
and noting that the probability that µT = µ is .5, we have:
WT = ¡ µ0
r + ±
Ã
M0 +
¯E0
r
!
+
¯E0
r(r + ±)
(µ0 ¡ 12µ)e¡rT ¡ 12Ke¡rT : (7)
7I am implicitly assuming that the discount rate r is the real risk-free rate of interest, so a value of .04 is
reasonable. A value of .02 for ± is high for the rate of natural removal of atmospheric GHGs (a concensus
estimate would be closer to .005), but is low for acid concentrations in lakes.
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Table 1: Parameter Values.
Parameter Value
r (discount rate) .04
± (pollutant decay rate) .02
¯ (absorption factor) 1
K (PV of cost of policy adoption) $2 billion
E0 (emission rate) 300,000 tons/year
µ0 (current social cost) $20/ton/year
µ (future social cost, low) $10/ton/year
µ (future social cost, high) $30/ton/year
T (¯xed delay time) 10 years
Is it better to adopt the policy at time t = 0 or wait until T? Comparing W0 to WT :
¢WT = WT ¡W0
= K(1¡ 1
2
e¡rT )¡ ¯E0µ0
r(r + ±)
(1¡ e¡rT )¡ ¯E0µ
2r(r + ±)
e¡rT : (8)
It is better to wait until time T if and only if ¢WT > 0.
This expression for ¢WT has three components. The ¯rst term on the right-hand side
of eqn. (8) is the present value of the net expected cost savings from delay; the sunk cost
K is initially avoided, and there is only a .5 probability that it will have to be incurred at
time T . Hence this term represents the opportunity cost of adopting the policy now rather
than waiting. The second and third terms are the present value of the expected increase
in social cost from environmental damage due to delay. The second term is the cost of
additional pollution between now and time T that results from delay, and the last term |
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the probability that µT = µ, times the present value of the cost of additional pollution over
time when µT = µ and Et = E0 for t ¸ T | is the expected pollution cost from time T
onwards. Thus the last two terms represent an \opportunity bene¯t" of adopting the policy
now.
We can therefore rewrite eqn. (8) as:
¢WT = FC ¡ FB ;
where
FC = K(1¡ 12e¡rT ) (9)
is the opportunity cost of adopting the policy now rather than waiting, and
FB =
¯E0µ0
r(r + ±)
(1¡ e¡rT ) + ¯E0µ
2r(r + ±)
e¡rT (10)
is the \opportunity bene¯t" of adopting now rather than waiting. Note that the larger is the
decay rate ±, i.e., the more reversible is environmental damage, the smaller is this bene¯t,
and hence the greater is the incentive to delay. (As ± !1, environmental damage becomes
completely reversible, and FB ! 0.) An increase in the discount rate, r, increases FC and
reduces FB, and thus also increases the incentive to delay.
In general, we can decide whether it is better to wait or adopt the policy now by calcu-
lating FC and FB. For our numerical example, we will assume (arbitrarily) that the ¯xed
time T is 10 years. Substituting this and the other base case parameter values into eqns.
(9) and (10) gives FC = $1.330 billion and FB = 0.824 + 0.419 = $1.243 billion. Hence
¢WT = FC ¡ FB = $0.087, so it is better to wait. In this case the opportunity cost of
current adoption slightly outweighs the opportunity bene¯t.
We assumed that if we delayed the adoption decision until time T , it would then be
optimal to adopt the policy if µT = µ, but not if µT = µ. To check that this is indeed the
case, we can calculate the smallest value of µT for which policy adoption at time T is optimal.
Since there is no possibility of delay after T , this is just the value of µ for which W0 ¡WN
is zero. Using eqns. (6) and (5), we see that this value is given by:
µ^T = r(r + ±)K=¯E0 : (11)
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For our base case parameter values, µ^T = $16/ton/year. Hence it would indeed be optimal
to adopt the policy at time T if µT = µ = 30, but not if µT = µ = 10.
Also, we assumed that policy adoption meant reducing E to zero. We could have instead
considered what the optimal amount of reduction should be. However, B(Mt; µt) is linear
in Mt and Mt depends linearly on E (see eqn. (4)), so the bene¯t of a marginal reduction
in E is independent of the level of E. Suppose, in addition, that the cost of reducing E is
proportional to the size of the reduction. Then if it is optimal to reduce E at all, it will
be optimal to reduce it to zero, so that the optimal timing is independent of the size of the
reduction. This will not be the case if the social cost function is convex inMt and/or the cost
of emission reduction is a convex function of the size of the reduction, as discussed below.
2.1 Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and a \Good News Principle."
We assumed that the cost of policy adoption is completely sunk, but the bene¯t (in terms
of reduced environmental damage) is only partially sunk (because ± > 0). Continuing with
our numerical example, we can get further insight into the e®ects of irreversibility and
uncertainty by varying the degree to which the policy bene¯t is sunk, and by varying the
amount of uncertainty over µT .
First, suppose that the pollutant decay rate is smaller than assumed earlier | speci¯cally,
that ± is .01 instead of .02. Note that FC will equal $1.330 billion as before, but now FB
= 0.989 + 0.503 = $1.492 billion, so that ¢WT = ¡$0:162 billion. In this case the greater
irreversibility of environmental damage makes the opportunity bene¯t of current adoption
greater than the opportunity cost, so that it is better to adopt the policy now.
Second, let us increase the variance of µT (while keeping its expectation the same) by
setting µ and µ equal to 0 and 40 respectively, instead of 10 and 30. This change has no
e®ect on the opportunity cost of adopting now, because there is still a .5 probability that
at time T we will regret having made the decision to spend K and adopt the policy; FC is
$1.330 billion as before. However, this increase in variance reduces the opportunity bene¯t
of immediate adoption by reducing the social cost of additional pollution for t > T under
the \good" outcome (i.e, the outcome that µT = µ). Setting ± equal to its base case value of
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.02, we have FB = .824 + 0 = $0.824 billion, so that ¢WT = 1:330¡ 0:824 = $0.506 billion,
which is much larger than before. Even if we lower ± to .01 (so that environmental damage
is more irreversible), FB = .989, ¢WT = $0.341 billion, and it is still optimal to wait.
This result is an example of Bernanke's (1983) \bad news principle," although here we
might call it a \good news principle." It is only the consequences of the outcome µT = µ,
an outcome that is good news for society but bad news for the ex post return on policy-
induced installed capital, that drive the net value of waiting. The consequences of the \bad"
outcome, i.e., that µT = µ, make no di®erence whatsoever in this calculation.
This good news principle might seem counterintuitive at ¯rst. Given the long-lasting im-
pact of environmental damage, one might think that the consequences of the high social cost
outcome (i.e., the outcome µT = µ) should a®ect the decision to wait and continue polluting.
But because the expected value of µT remains the same as we increase the variance, the
value of waiting depends only on the regret that is avoided under the good (low social cost)
outcome. Increasing the variance of µT increases the regret that society would experience
under the good outcome, and thereby increases the incentive to wait.
2.2 Allowing for Policy Reversal.
So far we have assumed that once a policy to reduce emissions to zero has been adopted, it
would remain in place inde¯nitely. We now examine how the timing decision changes when
a policy adopted at time 0 can be at least partially reversed at time T. In e®ect, we will be
relaxing our earlier assumption that the cost of policy adoption is completely sunk.
We will assume that upon reversal, a fraction Á of the cost K can be recovered. This
would be possible, for example, if K was at least in part the present value of a °ow of sunk
costs that could be terminated. (Of course, the investment decisions of ¯rms and consumers
in reponse to a policy adopted at time 0 would be altered by the awareness that there was
some probability of policy reversal at time T . For example, consumers and ¯rms would
probably delay some of their emission-reducing investments until they learned, at time T ,
whether the policy was going to be reversed. But this is consistent with the theory; it simply
makes the fraction Á larger than it would be without such an awareness.)
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We again assume that µT will equal µ or µ, each with probability .5. We will also assume
that the parameter values are such that if the policy was not adopted at t = 0, it would be
adopted at t = T if and only if µT = µ. However, if the policy is adopted at t = 0, would we
want to reverse it at time T if µT = µ? Clearly, this will depend on the value of Á, i.e., the
fraction of K that can be recovered.
As before, let W0 denote the value function when we adopt the policy at time 0, but note
that it is now di®erent because of the possibility of policy reversal. Speci¯cally, W0 must
now include the value of society's option (a put option) to reverse the policy at time T and
recover ÁK. Also, let WT again denote the value function when we wait and only adopt the
policy if µT = µ. (In this simple two-period framework, we do not allow for policy reversal
after time T .)
To determine W0 in this case, we need the trajectory for Mt when the policy is adopted
at t = 0 and reversed at t = T . From eqn. (1), that trajectory is given by:
Mt =
8<:
M0e
¡±t for 0 ∙ t ∙ T
(¯E0=±)
h
1¡ e¡±(t¡T )
i
+M0e
¡±t for t > T
(12)
Now we can determine the minimum value of Á for which it would be economical to
reverse the policy at t = T should µT = µ. Reversal is economical if the present value of the
cost of continued emissions is less than the recoverable cost ÁK, i.e., if:
(¯E0µ=±)
Z 1
T
h
1¡ e¡±(t¡T )
i
e¡r(t¡T ) dt < ÁK : (13)
This implies that the policy should be reversed if µT = µ at time T as long as
Á > Ámin =
¯E0µ
r(r + ±)K
: (14)
For our numerical example, with E0 = 300,000 tons/year,K = $2 billion, and µ = $10/ton/year,
Ámin = 0.625. Thus if Á < 0:625, the option to reverse the policy at time T has no value,
and our earlier results still hold.
Suppose Á > Ámin , so that the policy would indeed be reversed if µT = µ. Although WT
is still given by eqn. (7), by using eqn. (12) we can see that W0 is now given by:
W0 = ¡µ0M0
r + ±
¡ ¯E0µ
2r(r + ±)
e¡rT + 1
2
ÁKe¡rT ¡K : (15)
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The second and third terms on the right-hand side of (15) represent the value of the option
to reverse the policy at time T . That option value is positive as long as Á > Ámin.
Using eqns. (7) and (15), we ¯nd that ¢WT =WT ¡W0 is now given by:
¢WT = K
h
1¡ 1
2
(1 + Á)e¡rT
i
¡ ¯E0µ0
r(r + ±)
(1¡ e¡rT ) : (16)
The ¯rst term on the right-hand side of (16) is the opportunity cost of early policy adoption,
which we have denoted by FC , and the second term is the opportunity bene¯t, FB. Compar-
ing eqns. (16) and (8), note that both FC and FB are now smaller. Compared to the case
where the policy cannot be reversed, FC is reduced by the amount
1
2
ÁKe¡rT , which is the
expected value of the portion of sunk cost that can be recovered. In addition, FB no longer
has the term in µ, because now if µT = µ, the policy will be reversed.
Returning to our numerical example, suppose that Á = :9, which exceeds Ámin. Then
¢WT = FC ¡ FB = $0:726 billion ¡ $0:824 billion = ¡$0:098 billion ;
so that immediate adoption is better than waiting. The reason is that while the option to
reverse the policy has reduced both FC and FB, it has reduced FC by more. (FC falls from
$1.33 billion to $0.73 billion, a change of $0.60 billion, and FB falls from $1.24 billion to
$0.82 billion, a change of $0.42 billion.)
Suppose we increase the variance of µT as we did before by letting µ and µ equal 0 and
40 respectively, rather than 10 and 30. If Á = :9, ¢WT = ¡$97:8 million as before, so the
policy should still be adopted now. But note that increasing the variance of µT reduces the
minimum value of Á at which reversal is optimal if µT = µ. From eqn. (14), we see that now
Ámin = 0, so that once the policy has been adopted, reversal is always optimal if µT = µ. But
this does not mean that as long as µ = 0, the policy should be adopted now for any positive
value of Á. For example, if Á = :1, ¢WT = $438.4 million, so it is clearly better to wait.
By setting ¢WT = 0 (again with µ = 0), we can ¯nd the smallest value of Á for which early
adoption is optimal. Using eqn. (16), that value is Á = :754. For Á > :754, the put option
is su±ciently valuable so that early adoption is economical.
Although µ does not appear in eqn. (16), it is still only µ, and not µ, that a®ects the
timing decision. The reason is that only µ a®ects µmin, and hence only µ a®ects whether we
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would indeed exercise the put option should this low value of µT be realized. This is another
example of the \good news principle" discussed earlier.
2.3 Partial Reduction in Emissions.
Before moving to a more general model in which the time of adoption can be chosen freely, we
can exploit this simple framework further by allowing for a partial reduction in emissions.
This is of interest only if the cost of policy adoption is a convex function of the amount
of emission reduction (or, alternatively, if the bene¯t function B(Mt; µt) is convex in Mt).
Suppose that the cost of (permanently) reducing E from E0 to E1 ¸ 0 is:
K = k1(E0 ¡E1) + k2(E0 ¡ E1)2 ; (17)
with k1, k2 ¸ 0. Then the marginal cost of reducing E an additional unit below E1 is:
k(E) = ¡dK
dE
= k1 + 2k2(E0 ¡ E1) : (18)
The problem now is to decide when to adopt a policy, and then, at the time of adoption, to
decide by how much to reduce emissions. As before, we will assume that µT will equal µ or
µ with equal probability, and that µ does not change after time T . For simplicity, we will
assume that once a policy has been adopted it cannot be reversed.
Previously we solved eqn. (1) to determine the trajectory forMt when Et = E0 for t < T
and Et = 0 for t ¸ T . Now, policy adoption at time T implies that Et = E1 ¸ 0 for t ¸ T ,
so the trajectory for Mt is given by:
8
Mt =
8<: (¯E0=±)(1¡ e
¡±t) +M0e¡±t for 0 ∙ t ∙ T
(¯E0=±)(e
±T ¡ 1)e¡±t + (¯E1=±)[1¡ e¡±(t¡T )] +M0e¡±t for t > T
(19)
First, suppose we reduce E from E0 to an arbitrary level E1 at t = 0. Then the value
function, which we will denote by W0(E1), is:
W0(E1) = ¡µ0M0
r + ±
¡ ¯E1µ0
r(r + ±)
¡K(E1) : (20)
8Note that Mt must now satisfy the boundary conditions MT = (¯E0=±)(1 ¡ e¡±T ) + M0e¡±T and
M1 = ¯E1=±.
13
If we never adopt the policy, the value function is WN = ¡µ0M0=(r + ±)¡ ¯E0µ0=r(r + ±),
as before. Hence the conventionally measured NPV of policy adoption is:
W0(E1)¡WN = ¯(E0 ¡ E1)µ0
r(r + ±)
¡K(E1) : (21)
If we indeed adopt the policy at t = 0, we will choose E1 to maximize this NPV. Using
eqn. (17) for K(E1), the optimal value of E1 is:
E¤1 = E0 +
k1
2k2
¡ ¯µ0
2k2r(r + ±)
(22)
for ¯µ0=r(r + ±) > k1, and 0 otherwise. Assuming that ¯µ0=r(r + ±) > k1 and E1 = E
¤
1 , the
NPV of immediate adoption becomes:
W0(E
¤
1)¡WN =
1
4k2
"
¯µ0
r(r + ±)
¡ k1
#2
: (23)
Note that because E1 is chosen optimally, this NPV can never be negative.
A numerical example is again helpful. We will use the same parameter values as before
(see Table 1), and set k1 = 4000 and k2 = :02 (so that reducing E from 300,000 tons/year to
zero would cost $3.0 billion). In this case, E¤1 = 191,667 tons/year, so that ¢E
¤ = E0 ¡E¤1
= 108,333 tons/year, K(¢E¤) = $0.668 billion, and the NPV of immediate policy adoption
is W0(E
¤
1)¡WN = $0.234 billion.
So far we have compared reducing emissions to some amount E1 at time 0 to never
reducing them. Suppose instead that we wait until time T to decide how much (if at all)
to reduce emissions. If µT = µ we will reduce emissions to E, but if µT = µ we will reduce
emissions less, to E > E. Using eqn. (19) for Mt and for the time being letting E and E be
arbitrary, we can determine that the value function WT (E;E) is:
WT (E;E) = ¡µ0M0
r + ±
¡ ¯E0µ0
r(r + ±)
(1¡ e¡rT )¡ ¯e
¡rT
2r(r + ±)
(Eµ + Eµ)
¡ 1
2
K(E)e¡rT ¡ 1
2
K(E)e¡rT : (24)
The values of E and E must be chosen optimally to maximize WT (E;E). Setting the
derivatives of WT (E;E) with respect to E and E equal to zero, the optimal emission levels
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are:
E¤ = E0 +
k1
2k2
¡ ¯µ
2k2r(r + ±)
; (25)
E
¤
= E0 +
k1
2k2
¡ ¯µ
2k2r(r + ±)
: (26)
Should we reduce emissions now or wait until time T so that we can observe µT? As
before, we can compare W0 to WT , but now we must account for the fact that the amount of
emission reduction is determined optimally at the time of adoption, i.e., at t = 0 or at t = T .
To determine whether it is better to wait, we must calculate ¢WT =WT (E
¤; E
¤
)¡W0(E¤1).
Substituting E¤ and E¤ into eqn. (24) and E¤1 into eqn. (20) gives:
¢WT =
k1
2k2
"
¯µ0
r(r + ±)
¡ k1
2
#
(1¡ e¡rT ) ¡ ¯
2µ20
4k2r2(r + ±)2
+
¯2(µ2 + µ
2
)
8k2r2(r + ±)2
e¡rT : (27)
Using eqns. (22), (25), and (26), we can calculate that for our numerical example, E¤1
= 191,667 tons/year, E¤ = 295,833, and E
¤
= 87,500. Hence we ¯nd that ¢WT = $0.068
billion. In this case the opportunity cost of reducing emissions immediately outweighs the
opportunity bene¯t. Therefore it is better to wait until time T , and then reduce emissions
by a large amount if µT = µ, but reduce them only slightly if µT = µ.
This numerical outcome is, of course, dependent on our choice of parameters for the cost
function K. For example, if we reduce k1 from 4000 to 1000 (so that the cost of eliminating
the ¯rst ton of emissions is only $1,000), ¢WT becomes ¡$0:076 billion, so that immediate
policy adoption is preferred. The reason is that now greater reductions in E are optimal for
all possible values of µ (now E¤1 = 116,667, E
¤ = 220,833, and E¤ = 12,500), so that the
sunk bene¯t of reducing E immediately is larger, and the sunk cost is smaller.
As with the simpler versions of this two-period model, the timing decision also depends
on the variance of µT . To see this, let us increase the variance by setting µ and µ to 40 and 0
respectively. Now, using eqns. (22), (25), and (26) again, we see that E¤1 = 191,667 tons/year
as before, but E¤ = 400,000 tons/year, E¤ = 0, and ¢WT = $0.504 billion.9 Hence the value
of waiting increases. The reason is that the spread between E¤ and E¤ is now larger, so that
9Using eqn. (26), E
¤
= ¡16; 667. But we assume that negative values of E are not possible, so that E
will be reduced to 0 if µT = µ.
15
information arriving at time T has a bigger impact on policy actions, and on the outcomes
of those actions.
2.4 Summary.
In this section we examined a highly simpli¯ed problem in which there are only two possible
times at which a policy can be adopted | now, or a ¯xed time T in the future. Nonetheless,
the examples illustrate how the optimal timing of policy adoption can be a®ected in oppos-
ing ways by the interaction of uncertainty with each of two kinds of irreversibilities. For
example, by reducing the pollutant decay rate (i.e., by making environmental damage more
irreversible), we increased the opportunity bene¯t of early policy adoption to the point where
it outweighed the opportunity cost. To explore this tradeo® further, and determine how it
depends on di®erent sources of uncertainty, we need to move to a more general formulation
in which the time of adoption is a free choice variable. We turn to that next.
3 A Continuous-Time Model.
When the time of adoption is a free choice variable, the problem of maximizing the present
value function given by eqn. (3) becomes a classic optimal stopping problem: We must ¯nd
the threshold curve, µ¤(M), that triggers policy adoption.
I generalize the model in Pindyck (2000) by allowing both µt and Mt to evolve stochas-
tically. Speci¯cally, I will assume that µt follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dµ = ®µdt+ ¾1µdz1 ; (28)
and that M follows a controlled arithmetic Brownian motion:
dM = (¯E ¡ ±M)dt+ ¾2dz2 : (29)
There is no reason to expect stochastic °uctuations in µ and M to be correlated, so I will
assume that Et(dz1dz2) = 0 for all t. Finally, we will work with a social bene¯t function that
is quadratic in M , i.e.,
B(µ;M) = ¡µM2 : (30)
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For simplicity, I will assume that policy adoption implies reducing emissions from E0 to
zero, at a sunk cost of K = kE0. The problem is to ¯nd a rule for policy adoption that
maximizes the net present value function of eqn. (3) subject to eqn. (28) for the evolution
of µ, and eqn. (29) for the evolution of M .
This problem can be solved using dynamic programming by de¯ning a net present value
function for each of two regions. LetWN (µ;M) denote the value function for the \no-adopt"
region (in which Et = E0). Likewise, letW
A(µ;M) denote the value function for the \adopt"
region (in which Et = 0). Since B(Mt; µt) = ¡µtM2t , we know that WN (µ;M) must satisfy
the following Bellman equation:
rWN = ¡µM2 + (¯E0 ¡ ±M)WNM + ®µWNµ + 12¾21µ2WNµµ + 12¾22WNMM ; (31)
(Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts, e.g.,WNM = @W
N=@M .) Likewise,WA(µ;M)
must satisfy the Bellman equation:
rWA = ¡µM2 ¡ ±MWAM + ®µWAµ + 12¾21µ2WAµµ + 12¾22WAMM : (32)
These two di®erential equations must be solved for WN(µ;M) and WA(µ;M) subject to the
following set of boundary conditions: These value functions must also satisfy the following
set of boundary conditions:
WA(0;M) = 0 ; (33)
WN(0;M) = 0 ; (34)
WN(µ¤(M);M) = WA(µ¤(M);M)¡K ; (35)
WNµ (µ
¤(M);M) = WAµ (µ
¤(M);M) ; (36)
and
WNM (µ
¤(M);M) = WAM(µ
¤(M);M) : (37)
Here, µ¤(M) is a free boundary, which must be found as part of the solution, and which
separates the adopt from the no-adopt regions. It is also the solution to the stopping problem:
Given M , the policy should be adopted if µ ¸ µ¤(M). Boundary conditions (33) and (34)
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re°ect the fact that if µ is ever zero, it will remain at zero thereafter. Condition (35) is the
value matching condition; it simply says that when µ(M) = µ¤(M) and the option to adopt
the policy is exercised, the payo® net of the sunk cost K = kE0 is W
A(µ¤(M);M) ¡ K.
Finally, conditions (36) and (37) are the \smooth pasting conditions;" if adoption at µ(M)¤
is indeed optimal, the derivatives of the value function must be continuous at µ¤(M).
3.1 Obtaining a Solution.
Although eqn. (32) can be solved analytically, it is not possible to obtain an analytical
solution for eqn. (31) and the free boundary µ¤(M). These equations can be solved numeri-
cally, although doing so is nontrivial because (31) is an elliptic partial di®erential equation.
However, a complete analytical solution is possible if we set the decay rate, ±, to zero. Little
is lost by doing so, and that is the approach I take here.
With ± = 0, the analytical solution for WA(µ;M) is:
WA(µ;M) = ¡ µM
2
r ¡ ® ¡
¾22µ
(r ¡ ®)2 : (38)
To ¯nd a solution for WN(µ;M), we will surmise that it has the form:
WN (µ;M) = µ°G(M)¡ µM
2
r ¡ ® ¡
2¯2E20µ
(r ¡ ®)3 ¡
2¯E0µM
(r ¡ ®)2 ¡
¾22µ
(r ¡ ®)2 ; (39)
where G(M) is an unknown function, with G0(M) > 0 and G(0) > 0. We will verify that
the solution is indeed of this form. In particular, we will try solutions for which G(M) =
ae´M , so that the homogeneous solution to the di®erential equation would be of the form
WNh = aµ
°e´M . Substituting this into the di®erential equation, rearranging and canceling
terms, gives the following equation:
r = ®° + 1
2
¾21°(° ¡ 1) + 12¾22´2 + ¯E0´ : (40)
Note that this is an equation in both ° and ´. Hence we cannot solve this without making
use of other boundary conditions. In addition, we need to ¯nd the value of a.
In total, there are four unknowns for which solutions must be found: °, ´, a, and µ¤(M).
To solve for these four unknowns, we make use of eqn. (40), along with boundary conditions
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(35), (36), and (37).10 Boundary condition (35) implies:
¡ 2¯
2E20µ
¤
(r ¡ ®)3 ¡
2¯E0µ
¤M
(r ¡ ®)2 + a(µ
¤)°e´M = ¡K ; (41)
boundary condition (36) yields:
¡ 2¯
2E20
(r ¡ ®)3 ¡
2¯E0M
(r ¡ ®)2 + a°(µ
¤)°¡1e´M = 0 ; (42)
and boundary condition (37) yields:
a´(µ¤)°e´M =
2¯E0µ
¤
(r ¡ ®)2 : (43)
Equations (40), (41), (42), and (43) are all nonlinear, and must be solved simultaneously
for °, ´, a, and µ¤(M). This is most easily done by multiplying eqn. (42) by µ¤, and then
using eqn. (43) to eliminate a(µ¤)°e´M from that equation and from eqn. (41). The remaining
three equations then yield the following solution. De¯ning ­(M) ´ (r ¡ ®)M + ¯E0, the
exponent °(M) is given by:
° =
®­2 ¡ 1
2
¾21­
2 + (r ¡ ®)¯E0­
¾21­2 + ¾
2
2(r ¡ ®)2
24¡1 +
vuut1 + 2r[¾21­2 + ¾22(r ¡ ®)2]
[®­¡ 1
2
¾21­+ (r ¡ ®)¯E0]2
35 ; (44)
the exponent ´(M) is given by:
´ = (r ¡ ®)°=­ ; (45)
and the optimal stopping boundary is given by:
µ¤(M) =
°(r ¡ ®)3K
2(° ¡ 1)¯E0­(M) : (46)
Finally, the variable a is given by:
a =
2¯E0
(r ¡ ®)2´(µ
¤)1¡°e¡´M : (47)
Eqns. (44) and (46) completely determine the solution to the optimal timing problem:
Emissions should be reduced to zero when µ ¸ µ¤(M). Note that µ¤(M) is a declining
function of M , as we would expect. These equations, together with eqns. (45) and (47) also
determine the value of the option to adopt the emission-reducing policy, namely aµ°e´M .
10Eqn. (40) is a quadratic in °, so condition (34) is used to rule out one of the two solutions for °.
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3.2 Characteristics of the Solution.
By calculating solutions for di®erent combinations of values for the parameters ¾1 and ¾2,
we can explore how economic and ecological uncertainties a®ect the optimal timing of policy
adoption. To do this, we must choose a range of values for these parameters, as well as values
for the other parameters in the model, that are consistent with pollution and cost levels that
could arise in practice. We will do this in the context of GHG emissions and global warming.
For the real interest rate, absorption parameter, and intial level of emissions we will use
the same values as in the two-period model: r = :04, ¯ = 1, and E0 = 300,000 tons/year.
With the pollutant decay rate, ±, equal to zero, this rate of emissions would add 30 million
tons to the pollutant stock after 100 years.11 We will consider current pollutant stocks (of
human origin) in the range of 10 million to 150 million tons. We will set the present value
of the cost of policy adoption, K, at $4 billion; although the actual cost is likely to be much
larger, over a long period of time, much of it should be reversible. We will initially set ®, the
expected percentage rate of growth of µ, to zero, although we will also calculate solutions
for ® = :01.
Finally, as initial values for the volatility parameters, we use ¾1 = :2 and ¾2 = 1,000,000,
although we will also vary these numbers. This value for ¾1 implies an annual standard
deviation of 20 percent for the social cost generated by the pollutant stock, and a standard
deviation of 200 percent for a 100-year time horizon, a number that is consistent with current
uncertainties over this cost. The value for ¾2 implies a standard deviation of 10 million tons
for the stock level after 100 years, which is one-third of the expected increase in the stock
from unabated emissions.
Figure 1 shows the critical threshold µ¤(M) for values of M ranging from 0 to 16 million
tons. The middle curve is µ¤(M) for the base values of ¾1 = .2 and ¾2 = 1,000,000, and
µ¤(M) is also shown for ¾1 = 0, ¾2 = 1,000,000 and ¾1 = .4, ¾2 = 2,000,000. Note that these
curve are downward sloping, as we would expect | a larger M implies a larger social cost,
11Setting ± = 0 is a reasonable approximation for GHGs | the actual decay rate has been estimated to
be 0.5 percent or less.
20
and thus a lower value of µ at which it is optimal to adopt the policy.
For these parameters, the value of waiting is large. To see this, we can calculate a tradi-
tional net present value for the adoption decision at the critical threshold µ¤(M). Figure 2
shows (for each of the three cases in Figure 1) the present value of the gains from policy
adoption relative to the cost of adoption, K. Note that from eqns. (38) and (39), this ratio
is given by
PV=K = [2¯2E20µ=(r ¡ ®)3 + 2¯E0µM=(r ¡ ®)2]=K : (48)
Under a traditional NPV rule, adoption would occur when this ratio exceeds one. Observe
from Figure 2, however, that for small values ofM policy adoption is optimal only when this
ratio is considerably greater than one, and for our base case values of ¾1 and ¾2 this ratio
exceeds two for all values of M in the range considered.
Observe from Figures 1 and 2 that µ¤(M) and the ratio PV/K °atten out once K exceeds
4 or 5. The reason is that when M is large, continued emissions makes little di®erence for
uncertainty over future values of M , because they contribute little in percentage terms to
the expectations of those future values. (Recall from eqn. (29) that M follows a controlled
arithmetic Brownian motion). Thus for large M , the volatility of M , i.e., ¾2, makes a
negligible contribution to the value of waiting. This can be seen from the bottom curve in
Figure 2, for which ¾1 = 0. For large M the ratio PV/K is only slightly greater than one.
When ¾1 > 0, the ratio exceeds one, but only because of uncertainty over the future value
of µ and hence the future social cost of added emissions.
This illustrates an important di®erence between the e®ects of economic versus ecological
uncertainty. If stochastic °uctuations in the pollutant stock are arithmethic in nature,
those °uctuations create uncertainty over the future social cost of continued emissions only
because the social bene¯t function B(µ;M) is quadratic in M , Stochastic °uctuations in the
economic cost variable µ, however, shift the entire social bene¯t function for every level of
M . Of course one might argue that the process for M should be modelled as a controlled
geometric Brownian motion, so that the last term in eqn. (29) would be ¾2Mdz2. I have
seen little empirical support for this, however, and one would expect that unpredictable
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increases or decreases in M are due largely to under- or over-predictions of emissions levels
from various sources, and thus should not depend on the overall level of the pollutant stock.
Figure 3 shows the critical threshold µ¤(M) as a function of ¾1 for a value of M equal
to 50 million tons, and for the drift parameter ® set at zero and at .01. As with models
of irreversible investment, increases in uncertainty over the future \payo®s" from reduced
emissions increase the value of waiting, and raise the critical threshold µ¤(M). Increasing
the drift parameter, ®, from 0 to .01 reduces the threshold at each value of M ; a higher
value of ® implies higher expected future payo®s from reducing emissions now.
Figure 4 shows µ¤(M) as a function of ¾2, the volatility of M , again for a value of M
equal to 50 million tons, and for ® equal to 0 and .01. The threshold µ¤(M) increases with
¾2, but only slowly. As discussed above, with M = 50 million, continued emissions increase
M by a small amount in percentage terms over a 20 or 30 year period, so that stochastic
°uctuations in M can have only a small e®ect on the value of waiting (and that e®ect is
due to the convexity of B(µ;M)). Thus changes in ¾2 can have only a small e®ect on the
threshold that triggers policy adoption. (But note that changes in ¾2 will have a larger e®ect
on the threshold if M is small.) A change in ®, however, will again have a large e®ect on
the threshold because it changes the expected future payo®s from emissions reductions.
4 Conclusions.
Environmental policies, which impose sunk costs on society, are usually adopted in the face
of considerable uncertainties over their bene¯ts. On the other hand, the adoption of those
policies also yields \sunk bene¯ts" in the form of averted irreversible environmental damage.
These opposing incentives for early versus late adoption were illustrated in the context of a
simple two-period model in an emissions-reducing policy could be adopted either now or at
some ¯xed time in the future. This timing problem was explored again through the use of a
continuous-time model in which adoption could occur at any time, and there is uncertainty
over the future economic bene¯ts of policy adoption, and over the future evolution of the
pollutant stock.
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In both cases, I focused largely on a one-time adoption of an emission-reducing policy.
One might argue that policies could instead be adopted or changed on an \incremental"
basis; for example, a carbon tax could be imposed and then adjusted every few years in
response to the arrival of new information regarding global warming and its costs. In reality,
however, policy adoption involves large sunk costs of a political nature | it is di±cult to
adopt a new policy in the ¯rst place, or to change one that it is already in place.
In addition, I assumed that policy-induced costs were completely sunk, and that policy
adoption is irreversible in that the policy could not be partially or totally reversed in the
future. (In Section 2.2, however, I examined the implications of allowing for a single pol-
icy reversal.) It seems to me that this kind of irreversibility is often an inherent aspect of
environmental policy, both for policies that are in place (e.g., the Clean Air Act), and for
policies under debate (e.g., GHG emission reductions). Nonetheless, the assumption of com-
plete irreversibility may be extreme. Richer models are needed to explore the implications
of relaxing this assumption.
Finally, one could argue that my speci¯cation of the stochastic process for the stock of
pollutant, M , is restrictive. This process could easily be generalized, but it would then be
necessary to obtain numerical solutions of the di®erential equations for the value functions.
That would be a logical extension of this work, because one could then also allow for a
non-zero decay rate, ±.
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